MFIs and the Crisis
In a recent televised debate among some of the world’s authorities on international economics, Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, stated that microfinance was a field that had weathered the global financial crisis particularly well, despite the slowdown of international funding. In mentioning this to the Executive Director of the microfinance firm where I am currently consulting, I got the distinct impression that he did not agree. Certainly others with whom I’ve spoken to on the ground in South Africa would second that notion – the last few terms had been much harder than before. This made me wonder. Many of the MFIs here have particular barriers to success as compared to other places in the world, partially for the reasons that I had outlined in my previous post. However, this made me curious to find out how specifically the financial crisis had affected MFIs worldwide and in particular, how it had affected South African MFIs. Were there factors that made MFIs more or less resilient in the face of such a crisis? If there were, how could MFIs best learn from what had happened and better prepare themselves going forward? Some brief research into the matter, as well as conversations with those on the front lines led to a few answers, but in the end left me with more questions, and not all of them related to the current crisis. A summary of my findings is below.
First of all, looking at the field of microfinance as a whole in light of the current crisis, there are definitely signs of strain. Though many argue that microfinance has managed to show some resilience, it has not shown as much resilience as in past crises, partly due to the fact that the field in general is now a lot more connected to the international markets, and partly due to the sheer size and pervasiveness of the current crisis[1]. In addition, the high prices of food and fuel are an issue, especially to the poor. This could have even more consequences in a country like South Africa, which has such a high level of division between the rich and the poor, and therefore a high level of availability of all kinds of goods, many of which those at the bottom end of the spectrum simply cannot afford despite having physical access to them. The chances of MFI clients in South Africa using their loans for consumer purchases then seems to be even more of a risk than other places simply due to the ease of availability of those goods as compared to other developing countries. According to KM (the director of the MFI where I work), this is the real challenge facing the industry. He notes that firstly clients will tend to use their loans for consumption before thinking about growing their businesses, and secondly, their businesses are generally not doing well because the neighbourhood’s income has gone down due to retrenchments and high prices of the commodities.
This brings up the next risk of the overall availability of funds in the poor communities, which are needed in part to keep the micro-enterprises of MFI borrowers running. For example, many mining projects that were supposed to take place in South Africa have been put on hold, meaning that there was loss of jobs in this sector. At the lower levels this would mean that those who would have had those jobs and spent some of their money with micro-entrepreneurs now cannot, meaning a loss of income for the entrepreneurs and therefore increased chance of them defaulting. This may not be much of a risk in communities that are less connected overall to the international markets, like certain isolated rural areas, but in South Africa even the most rural communities have some connection to the large companies and industries, and are therefore at increased danger from the events taking place on the international sphere.
In terms of sources of funding, it would seem that in South Africa a lot of the funding tends to come from within country, or is filtered through that way so this would minimize exchange rate risks as well as mean that a slow of international funding would not necessarily affect the MFIs. In addition, in terms of vulnerability, South African banks do not have a high degree of international owernship, like many other African countries, which helps reduce the effects of the financial crisis. However, on closer examination many of the government funds and apex funding is coming from abroad, so the effects of decreased international funding would still be there in an indirect way. The best thing for MFIs to minimize their risk in these terms is to make sure they have multiple sources of diverse funding. In South Africa many of the good MFIs have 5 to 6 funders, while the ones with less than two tend to show more signs of strain. In any case, it is a good risk management policy for MFIs to make sure they have as many different funders as possible. Although it means answering to more sources, and may therefore increase administration time, the reduction in risk may well be worth it. This is especially true for small and young MFIs which are still not financially self-sustaining and are thus more reliant on donor funds.
In researching this topic, it did seem that there are a lot of theories but little hard proof of the effects of the crisis. This actually helps to highlight a big gap in the microfinance field – one of solid measurement and evaluation of impact. We continually hear anecdotal stories of microloans helping throughout the world, but although there is an increasing call for more quantitative and hard evaluation of the effectiveness of MFIs, it seems that this data is still hard to find. This avenue of thought led me away from the crisis and on to another topic – just how effective is microfinance in terms of economic development?
Is MFI really the solution to poverty?
Related to the above point, there are now more individuals who believe that microfinance may not be a cure all for the world’s poor, and that the lack of hard proof to show how much economic development microfinance brings about is actually due to the lack of such evidence. Bateman and Chang[2] argue that the oversaturation of microfinance in certain areas may be doing more harm than good. They suggest that because of the over availability of microloans many small entrepreneurs who would go out of business due to competition from much more efficient micro entrepreneurs are now instead being kept afloat and are thus artificially creating an oversaturation of the micro-entrepreneur market, which prevents any one microenterprise from scaling up significantly. They suggest that while the more efficient enterprises might naturally scale up and develop economically on their own, due to this newly created artificial competition, they are unable to do so. Thus while the presence of microloans ensures that more of the poor can have a slightly better lifestyle, they are still all kept together at the much lower level than middle and upper level business. This is an interesting thing to consider, and a topic that I will have to do more research in to in order to speak on more fully.
Speaking again with KM, who has been in the industry for a long time, he had the following to say regarding the above: “CGAP has conducted several studies as have many other social rating organisations. In South Africa I know at least one MFI had participated in such an Impact Assessment study whilst I was working there. The agreement amongst practitioners and observers alike is that microfinance is not a panacea to poverty. If microfinance was a doctor dealing with human bodies, I would liken it to a dentist. That is, other doctors still have a role to play in the human body, not only a dentist. The fact that 2006 was the Microfinance Year throughout the world because of the Grameen model having won the Nobel Peace Price, proves beyond reasonable doubt that there are hard facts out there to show the impact of the industry in the lives of the poor.”
Personally, I tend to agree. I believe in the power of microcredit to make a difference in the lives of the poor. However, I do think that more research needs to go into the actual impact and long term effects of microcredit programs and more needs to be done in terms of reporting. Without a doubt, microfinance done badly can do more harm than good, but without it, what exactly are the alternatives? As with anything, it seems that we simply need to think about possible outcomes, do more strenuous measurement and evaluation, and get more feedback from long term clients. In the end, if the clients are happy that must show that at least something is working.
[1] http://crisistalk.worldbank.org/2008/11/microfinance-an.html
[2] The Microfinance Illusion: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/chang/pubs/Microfinance.pdf
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